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NOTES AND CoMmEmTs 368
involved in these situations can constitutionally confer jurisdiction upon state courts
over non-resident natural persons, it seems that the same result should be reached
in respect to foreign corporation. The suggested rule would allow state courts
to take jurisdiction over all causes of action connected with solicitation within the
state. It would not include a purely transitory cause of action which is unrelated
to any act done within the state. Perhaps in this class of cases there is greater
merit in the "fair play and substantial justice" theory than any other. If a cor-
poration is carrying on regular and continuous solicitation within the state there
is nothing "unfair" in reqmring it to defend a suit on a transitory cause of action,
but not otherwise.
It is impossible at the present time to determine whether the Green case and
its "mere solicitation" rule has been completely absorbed in the broader theory
of the International Shoe Co. case. However, the reception of the latter case by
the state and lower federal courts and the broad language of the case itself indi-
cate that in the near future, if not already, "mere solicitation" by a corporation
will be sufficient to subject it to the jurisdiction of the state where the solicitation
occurred. Therefore, if the decision in the Green case has not veen overruled, it
may safely be said that it has been quietly interred.
ARLOE W MAYNE
PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS OF DECEASED EMPLOYEES AS'TAXABLE
INCOME OF THE WIDOW - I.T. 4027
I.T. 4027, recently issued by the Income Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, has laid down the rule that "irrespective of a plan voluntary or invol-
untary, definite or indefinite, payments made by an employer to the widow
of a deceased officer or employee, in consideration of services rendered by the
officer or employee, are includible in the gross income of the widow for Federal
income tax purposes." This ruling, which is applicable to payments received
beginmng January 1, 1951, represents a substantial change from the previous
Treasury position.
In 1921, in O.D. 1017, the Treasury held that a payment to the widow of a
deceased officer of his salary for two months after his death was a gratuity and
was not taxable income of the widow. In I.T. 3329,' in 1939, it was ruled that
payments made for a reasonable time by a corporation to the widow of a de-
ceased officer were deductible by the corporation as a business expense but were
not taxable income to the widow. In this I.T., it was said that "When an allow-
ance is paid by an organization to which the rectpient had rendered no service
[italics, writer s), the amount is deemed to be a gift or gratuity and is not subject
to Federal income tax in the hands of the recipient." Thus, an attractive oppor-
tunity was offered to employers to make tax free "3329 payments'" to widoiws and
still deduct them as a business expense.' It is clear, however, that the courts
have not generally gone as far as the implications of LT. 8329.
'1950 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 21 at 2; 505 CCH par. 6208.
'5 Cum. Bull. 101 [501 CCH par. 52.4741. This was expressly reversed by
I. T. 4027. See also T. D. 2090 to the same effect. Dec. 14, 1914 [501 CCH par.
52.4741. This was expressly overruled by I. T. 4027.
'1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153. This was expressly overruled by L T. 4027 on the
point herein discussed.
'P-H Students Tax Law Service, Current Matter, par. 10, 182' (1950).
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In 1942, the district court, in the case of Mary Sutro v. U. S.,' held that a
lump sum paid to the widow of a deceased employee under a "voluntary" insur-
ance plan of the employer was taxable as income of the widow. The court said
that although the plan was voluntary, there was an enforceable obligation in favor
of the widow, and an enforceable obligation and a gift are mutually exclusive.
In 1947, in I.T. 3840,6 the Treasury, relying largely on the Sutro case, adopted a
rule to the effect that payments received by the widow of a deceased employee
pursuant to the terms of a voluntary death benefit plan constitute taxable income
of the widow. It was said therein that there was an enforceable obligation in
such a situation, the consideration for which was the services rendered by the
husband.
Flarsheim v. U S., decided in 1946, also involved an enforceable contract.
The husband had contracted that after his death, his wife was to receive a pay-
ment of $12,000 per year out of the net earmngs of a particular one of the em-
ployer s offices. The payments had previously been held to be deductible by the
employer.8 Vhile this case is generally treated as a case of payments by an
employer to the widow of a deceased employee, it would seem to be distinguish-
able from the general line of such cases, especially upon the basis upon which the
court put its decision. The court treated this as a situation where the widow had
received a right to the income from a particular property-a contract right giving
her an equitable charge upon the business of th. particular office. The court
relied upon Irvin v. Gavit' and Blair v. Com r. in this respect, so it would appear
that they were looking at it as a case where the widow received an interest in an
income producing corpus or its equivalent.
In 1946, in Varnedoe v. Allen,"i payments to a widow of a fireman made pur-
suant to a state law were held to be income to the widow. It was in this case
that the court made the statement, strongly emphasized in I.T. 4027, that "It -is
not necessary that the services should have been rendered by the payee. The
payor is the one to whom the services must have been rendered."' A dissent in
this case said that the widow should not be taxed. The dissenting judge believed
that since part of the money for the payments came from a three per-cent payroll
deduction from the husband's salary, that money was his income and should have
been taxed to him, and the remainder of the money for the payments was a gift
or gratuity from the state. I.T. 3972,%' in 1949, expressly relied on this case and
ruled that a death benefit payment made to the widow of an employee of the
Government of the Territory of Hawaii paid pursuant to Hawaiian law was taxable
as income. However, here, the husband had made no contribution to the fund
from which the payment was made. On the other hand, in a special ruling, in
4_2 USTC par. 9523 (N. D. Cal. 1942).
1947-1 Cum. Bull. 7.
156 F 2d 105 (C. C. A. 8th 1946).Seavey & Flarsheimn Brokerage Co. v. Coin r., 41 B. T. A. 198 (1940).
8268 U. S. 161 (1925) (holding that income given from the income of a
trust fund is income to the recipient although the recipient has no interest in the
corpus).
a300 U. S. 5 (1937) (holding that the income beneficiary of a trust had an
equitable interest in the corpus of the trust so that an assignment by him of the
trust income was an assignment of income producing property not an assignment
of income due to the assignor).
1158 F 2d 467 (C. A. A. 5th 1946), cert. demed, 330 U. S. 821 (1947).
Id. at 468.
1949-2 Cum. Bull. 15.
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1946, the Bureau stated that widows of former governors, the present governor,
and the governor-elect at the time the statute was passed would not be taxed on
a $3,000 annual pension to be paid to them under an Indiana statute, on the
ground that such payments constituted gifts.A
In ApriU v. Corn r., a Tax Court case decided in 1949, it was held, with
express citation of I.T. 3329, that where the widow had rendered no services and
the corporation had no obligation of any ind to pay her, payments to the widow
were not taxable as her income. This case was similar to the case laid down in
LT. 3329 in that, in each, the payments were not made pursuant to any enforceable
obligation or plan and were authorized only after the death of the husband. The
cases do differ in that an the Aprill case, the commissioner was attempting to tax
payments which the employer had not been allowed to deduct. However, pay-
ments had been made for two prior years and had been deducted as an expense
without any attempt by the commissioner to tax the widow or disallow the de-
duction.
In Haden v. Com r.,8 in 1946, the employer claimed a deduction for pay-
ments made to a widow. The Tax Court disallowed the deduction, and, in its
opimon, stated, "In the absence of a finding that the payments made to the widow
are in the nature of additional compensation, and in the absence of a contract
with the deceased employee for such payments, they must be considered as gifts,
which are not taxable to the recipient [italics, writer s] ,,v
Thus stood the law on this matter before I.T. 4027.
Section 126 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that income in respect of
a decedent is taxable as income when received by a person who, by reason of the
death of the decedent, acquires the right to receive- such amount. None of the
cases or rulings just discussed consider the applicability of this section except
I.T. 3840," which didn't appear to rely on it but merely cited it at the end. While
it may be that this section is applicable in such cases, its applicability is open to
question."9
Nowhere has the writer found the possibility discussed that these cases, at
least the ones involving enforceable contracts, might be cases of third-party
beneficiary contracts with the widows as donee beneficiaries. Perhaps this absence
of discussion alone is sufllcient to cause such a possibility to be discounted. In
the Flarsheim case, the court stated that the wife was a third party beneficiary,'
but it apparently placed no significance on that fact. However, Paul says that a
third party beneficiary may be the recipient of a gift taxable under the gift tax.-*,
Even in the case of annuity payments received by a third party beneficiary, the
recipient is taxed, under the income tax law, only on that part of the payments
- Feb. 14, 1946, 464 C. C. H. par. 6241,.
13 T. C. 707 (1949).
'65 T. C. M. 250 [reported at 464 C. C. H. par. 7403] (1946), aff'd & revd
on other issues, 165 F 2d 588 (C. C. A. 5th, 1948).
' 5 T. C. M. 250, - as quoted in 505 C. C. H. par. 8713C and in Obern-
dorfer, Payments to Widows of Deceased Employees, 25 Taxes 711 at 719 (1947).
:8 Supra note 6. See Oberndorfer, op. cit. supra note 17 at 717.
'See 501 C. C. H. par. 52.472; 505 C. C. H. par. 8713C. For a discussion
of the reason for the enactment of See. 126, see GRISWOLD, CASES on FEDERAL
TAxA-noN 374 (3rd ed. 1950).
156 F 2d 105, 107 (C. C. A. 8th 1946). Also see statdments in Mary
Sutro v. U. S., 42-2 USTC par. 9523 (N. D. Cal. 1942).
2t2 PAuL. FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION sec. 16.13 (1942).
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which represent interest on the sum originally paid by the donor but is not taxed
on that part of the payments which represent the cost to the donor.--
Nor has the Lucas v. Earl' concept, that -income is taxed to the person who
earned it, been alluded to in any of the foregoing cases or rulings except the
Flarshezm case, wherein the widow made such a contention. There the court
rejected it, relying principally upon the particular facts of that case in that, the
husband had no interest in the office which produced the income and had no
interest in the future income earned by it which he could assign. The court,
therein, said that Lucas v. Earl and similar cases "turn on the principle that title
to income when produced belongs to the owner of the fund which produced it.1'2 t
However, at least one writer has criticized these cases taxing pryments to widows
on the ground that they apparently violate the Lucas v. Earl pnnciple.n
But regardless of these possible criticisms, it seems clear that payments to the
widow of a deceased employee have ultimately been treated the same as payments
to living employees. -'
Regulation 111, Sec. 29.22(a)-2 which says in part, "However, so-called
pensions or gratuities awarded by one to whom no services have been rendered
[italics, writer s] are mere gifts or gratuities and are not taxable," has been con-
sidered as inapplicable to such cases as discussed herein because services have
been rendered to the employer.' It is uncertain whether I.T. 3329 was intended
to be based upon this Regulation or whether it was intended to be based on a
belief that such payments as it considered actually constituted gifts.
It is not completely clear just how far I.T. 4027 is intended to go. It pur-
ports to apply only to payments made "in consideration of services rendered by
the officer or employee." This clearly does not mean that "consideration" in the
contract sense is necessary There need be no legal obligation before the pay-
ments will be treated as made for consideration and not a gift.' A moral obliga-
tion may be sufficient. Past services may be treated as consideration for payments
by an employer which are intended as additional compensation.' Thus, the prob-
lem arises as to whether payments to widows which are not deductible by the
employer fall within the scope of the I.T. or are gifts. Payments made to the
widow of a deceased employee are often deductible by the employer because they
are paid as compensation for .past services and are reasonable in amount, or are
paid pursuant to a plan or contract liability.' Also, Regulation 111, See. 29.23(a)-9
allows a deduction for a limited pienod for payments of the decedent's salary to
his widow in recognition of past services rendered. st When the deduction for such
payments is disallowed from the outset, or when it is disallowed because the
limited period has passed, it might be that the courts will consider the payments to
be gifts, which are excluded from gross income in Section 22(b) of the Internal
"See. 22 (b) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code. MACiLL, TAXABLE: INcOME
434 (2nd ed. 1945).
=281 U. S. Ill (1930).
-156 F 2d 105, 108 (C. C. A. 8th 1946).
-Oberndorfer, op. cit. supra note 17 at 716, esp. n. 45.
' Ibid.
' Oberndorfer, op. cit. supra note 17 at 718; I. T. 4027, cited supra note 1.
' MAGILL, Op. cit. supra note 22 at 401.
Id. at 895.
o Oberndorfer, op. cit. supra note 17- 505 C. C. H. par. 8586; see Pfeifer
Corp. v. Corr:, 14 T. C. -- No. 71 (as reported in 505 C. C. H. par. 7384)
(1950); McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Coi r., 11 T. C. 569, 575 (1948).
SI See 505 C. C. H. par. 8713D; I. T., 3329, supra note 8.
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Revenue Code. The April case held such non-deductible payments to be gifts,
and the Haden case called them gifts.' However, it is not absolutely necessary
that payments made to former employees be deducted before they can be con-
sidered as compensation." It is apparently the opimon of some that the new I.T.
is intended to tax even the non-deductible payments.' It has also been suggested
that as a result of this new ruling, the right of employers to dedtict may possibly
be extended by the Treasury since there is no longer any reason why the employer
should not be able to deduct them.' However, it is not too unlikely that the pur-
pose of the new ruling is to eliminate the tax loophole of "3329 payments," and
thus, may be intended to tax all such deductible payments but only to tax those
payments which are deductible by the employer.
Irrespective of these possibilities, it is clear that if I.T. 4027 meets the ap-
proval of the courts, another type of income has been removed from that very
exclusive category of tax-free income.
JAMES C. BLAIR
: "Such rejection of the gift concept in all cases faces a battle in the
courts. In the long run, it may be decided that three months pay to a pro-
fessor s widow is a true gift and nontaxable, although two years' high salary to
the widow of an industrialist carries too much aroma of rearrangement to be
treated otherwise than as post mortem earned compensation.' Maguire, Individual
Federal Income Tax in 1951, 36 A.A.U.P. 766 at 771 (1950).
'Also see Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F 2d 286, 287 (C. C. A. 9th 1929); cf. Ben-
yon v. Thorpe, [19281 97 L. J. K. B. 705, 44 T. L. R. 610. But see, Bass v. Haw-
ley, 62 F 2d 721, 723 (C. C. A. 5th 1933). All are cases dealing with gifts to
employees.
"ZMAiLL, op. cit. supra note 22 at 399.
See 505 C. C. H. par. 8493; P-H Students Tax Law Service, Current Mat-
ter, par. 10,182 (1950); 505 C. C. H. 8521 apparently says that treatment of
payments to widow as her income and treatment of payments as not deductible
by the employer are two separate and distinct matters, citing Putnam v. Corn r.,
15 T. C. - No. 13, reported at 505 C. C. H. par. 7585.
.P-H Students Tax Law Service, supra note 35.
